Fodor Jerry's Documents

Fodor Jerry's Documents

A Reply to Brian Loar's 'Must Beliefs Be Sentences'

A Reply to Brian Loar's 'Must Beliefs Be Sentences'
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The Language of Thought

The Language of Thought
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Is Radical Interpretation Possible

Is Radical Interpretation Possible
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Review of Christopher Hughes

Review of Christopher Hughes
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Brandom's Burdens

Brandom's Burdens
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The Dogma that Didn't Bark (A Fragment of a Naturalized Epistemology)

The Dogma that Didn't Bark (A Fragment of a Naturalized Epistemology)
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LOT 2: The Language of Thought Revisited

LOT 2: The Language of Thought Revisited
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Reply to Professor Zaitchik

Reply to Professor Zaitchik
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A Reply to Brian Loar's 'Must Beliefs Be Sentences'

A Reply to Brian Loar's 'Must Beliefs Be Sentences'
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The Mind Doesn't Work That Way

The Mind Doesn't Work That Way
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Reply to Professor Zaitchik

Reply to Professor Zaitchik
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The Mind Doesn't Work That Way: The Scope and Limits of Computational Psychology

The Mind Doesn't Work That Way: The Scope and Limits of Computational Psychology
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Observation Reconsidered

Observation Reconsidered
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The mind doesn't work that way: the scope and limits of computational psychology

The mind doesn't work that way: the scope and limits of computational psychology
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On Knowing What We Would Say

On Knowing What We Would Say
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Special Sciences, or The Disunity of Science as a Working Hypothesis

Special Sciences, or The Disunity of Science as a Working Hypothesis
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Methodological Solipsism Considered as a Research Strategy in Cognitive Psychology

Methodological Solipsism Considered as a Research Strategy in Cognitive Psychology
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Special Sciences - Still Autonomous After All These Years

Special Sciences - Still Autonomous After All These Years
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The Appeal to Tacit Knowledge in Psychological Explanation

The Appeal to Tacit Knowledge in Psychological Explanation
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A Reply to Churchland's 'Perceptual Plasticity and Theoretical Neutrality'

A Reply to Churchland's 'Perceptual Plasticity and Theoretical Neutrality'
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Concepts; A Potboiler

Concepts; A Potboiler
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Against Darwinism

Against Darwinism
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There Are No Recognitional Concepts

There Are No Recognitional Concepts
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In Critical Condition: Polemical Essays on Cognitive Science and the Philosophy of Mind (Representation and Mind)

In Critical Condition: Polemical Essays on Cognitive Science and the Philosophy of Mind (Representation and Mind)
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The Elm and the Expert: Mentalese and Its Semantics

The Elm and the Expert: Mentalese and Its Semantics
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LOT 2: The Language of Thought Revisited

LOT 2: The Language of Thought Revisited
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Concepts: Where Cognitive Science Went Wrong

Concepts: Where Cognitive Science Went Wrong
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The Modularity of Mind

The Modularity of Mind
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No title

No title
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Concepts: Where Cognitive Science Went Wrong

Concepts: Where Cognitive Science Went Wrong
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